study (Song et al. 2007 ) that compared the predictive accuracy of judgmental forecasters with statistical systems was based on 31,000 observations of real-time predictions of the outcomes of American professional football games.
2 Although we make extensive use of data from these betting markets, we do not examine the economic efficiency of these markets.
This paper is concerned with a number of forecasting topics in horse racing and several team sports. The first topic involves the type of forecast that is made. In some sports the forecast is intended to determine the winner of an event. In other betting markets, individuals predict whether/or not the favored team wins by x points (called the point spread). It should be noted that the information (summary forecasts) that is obtained from these markets is related to the underlying characteristics and scoring systems of each sport. In sports where there is no binary outcome (horse racing, soccer, etc.), the market provides odds (probabilities) about the likelihood of each outcome .Even when there is a binary outcome, such as in baseball, the market quotes odds against each of the outcomes. However, in other binary outcome sports, such as basketball and American football, odds (probabilities) are not quoted. Rather the summary statistic is the point spread. This number is the median value of the probability distribution for the difference in scores. 3 This statistic thus provides information that distinguishes between teams that are closely matched and those where there is a clear favorite.
A second topic involves the procedures that are used to evaluate the forecasts. This paper will show that the evaluation procedures depend on the type of betting market that is associated with each sport. A third topic involves a comparison of alternative forecasting methods. For 2 Moreover, since a sporting event has a definite outcome at a specific point in time, it is not necessary to make assumptions about expectations as to the future as is necessary in other asset markets. 3 We wish to thank the referee for pointing this out. 6 every sport, forecasts have been made by models (systems) and experts. In some sports, it is also possible to analyze a forecast that is made by the market. The final topic is to determine whether the forecasts are biased and, if they are, the sources of the biases.
These topics will not be discussed on a sport-by-sport basis. Rather we will integrate the results across sports and in the process provide extensive citations referring to each sport. We then determine whether the results for individual team sports and horse racing yield valid generalizations about sports forecasting. Finally, we compare the findings from sports forecasts with the profession's generally accepted beliefs about forecasting knowledge and see whether they are consistent.
I. Types of Forecasts
The forecasts that we examine come from three sources. First, there is the betting market forecast itself. Second, forecasts can be derived from statistical models that are based on the fundamentals of the sports or are based on variables that are proxies for these characteristics.
Finally, experts, be they bookmakers, handicappers or sports commentators, also issue forecasts about the likely outcomes of sporting events.
A. Betting Market Forecasts
Given that the forecasts are generally associated with and obtained from the gambling market, it is first necessary to discuss how the markets are structured and the type of forecast that can be analyzed. The gambling markets are constituted differently from sport to sport. In horse racing, baseball, and soccer the bet (forecast) involves picking a winner, and the market quotes 7 odds that a particular horse or team will win. 4 As an example, if there were only two teams and there were no commissions, the odds on Team A might be 2 to1 and the odds on Team B would then be 1 to 2. This forecast implies that Team B will beat Team A 2/3 of the time. This type of forecast can be evaluated in two ways: (1) was the market correct and did Team B win more frequently or (2) in repeated trials, did teams that were favored 2-1 win 2/3 of the time?, i.e. were the probability forecasts calibrated?
In markets where odds are quoted and there are more than two competitors (horse racing) or more than two outcomes (soccer: win, draw lose), it is not possible to determine whether the market forecasts correctly predicted the winners. Rather the forecasting evaluation must be based on a comparison of the market odds (ex ante probabilities) and the ex post relative frequencies of the actual outcomes. The betting odds must, therefore, be converted into probabilities by the formula, p = 1/(1+odds).
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For each ex ante probability, p i , the ex post proportion of winning horses that went off at those odds, f i , should be equal to p i . Using statistical terminology, the ex ante probabilities and the ex post winning percentage should be calibrated, and horses whose ex ante probability of winning was 0.30 should have won 30 percent of the time.
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The betting market that involves baseball has a unique way of presenting the odds. While bets in this market are made on the outcome of a game, the odds are not quoted directly. The bookmaker quotes, a line, +140, -150 for example. This means that the winner of a $100 bet on 4 The betting market in golf and tennis, two markets that are not analyzed here, function similarly. 5 The sum of the betting odds exceeds one because of the bookmakers' commissions or the parimutuel take;
they must be adjusted so that they sum to one. 6 The quadratic probability score (QPS) as also known as the Brier Score can be used to evaluate probability forecasts when the relative frequencies of the outcomes are known. 8 the underdog team would win $140, while someone betting on the favored team would bet $150
to win $100. The difference is the commission. From these odds it is possible to calculate the betting market's forecast that the underdog will win. The probability is calculated at the midpoint of the line, i.e. 1/(1.45 +1) = 0.41 . This probability can then be compared with the percentage of times that the underdog won when those odds were quoted to determine whether the ex ante probabilities are calibrated with the observed relative frequencies.
The forecasts and the evaluation procedures are different in those markets where bets are placed on the margin of victory. In American football and basketball, bets are not made on which team will win nor are odds quoted in the market. Rather there is a bet on whether or not the favored team will win by more or less than the specified margin (point spread) that is set in the market. 7 While this type of betting market is not concerned with selecting the winning team, it is possible to use the data about the spread to determine whether the market accurately predicts who will win. Thus, our analysis of the forecasts from this type of betting market examines two questions: (1) How frequently does the team that is favored to win actually win? and (2) Are there any observed biases in the spreads that were published just before the game was played?
It is also possible to determine if the market forecasts are more accurate than those of other forecasting methods, such as models and the opinions of experts.
B. Models
In order to predict the outcome of sporting events, many different types of models have been constructed, but, unfortunately, many of these models have never been used in forecasting beyond the period of fit. Only the major characteristics of these models are explained in the text.
Some models are disaggregated; others are based on production functions or power scores. There are even models that use payrolls as predictors of success within a sport. (See Smyth and Smyth, 1994 for baseball; Szymanski, 2003 , p. 1154 and Forrest et al. (2005a for soccer). The form of each of the models and the variables that are included in the equations are presented on a sportby-sport basis in the Appendix.
At the most disaggregated level, it is possible to predict the outcome of a game by modeling the effects of every play. (For baseball see Bukiet 8 et al. (1997) and Sauer (2005) ; for soccer see Carmichael et al. (2000) ). At a more aggregative level, production functions are used.
These functions focus on the fundamental factors that determine the outcome of a game. On offense it is the factors that determine the number of points, runs, or goals scored; on defense the factors that determine the number of points, runs, or goals allowed. The model that is used to forecast the outcome of a game is then based on the differences in the fundamental characteristics of the two teams.
An alternative statistical procedure is to construct a power score or index that is a proxy for these fundamental characteristics or the latent skills and strengths of the teams. Such a model uses the difference in runs (points, goals) scored as a predictor. Then there are models that use power scores based on relative performance as the independent variables. (Boulier and Stekler, 2003) .
Statistical scoring systems are variants of power scores. As an example, Sagarin has developed a system that can be used to predict the expected scoring by any two teams. This system is based on the number of victories of each team, the strength of the teams that were defeated, the margin of victory adjusted for blowouts, and an adjustment for the home court advantage.
C. Experts
Finally, we have predictions made by individuals (experts) who may or may not reveal their methods. Some of these experts are sports writers, editors of newspapers or sports magazines, or sports commentators on the major television networks; others are tipsters. The odds makers in the betting markets and the race-track handicappers should also be considered experts.
II. Results-Betting Market
In presenting our results it should be remembered that the procedures for evaluating forecasts will differ from sport to sport depending upon the institutional structure of the betting market that is associated with that sport.
A. Horse racing 9 The difference between two teams' Sagarin ratings is a good predictor of the margin of victory (Carlin, 1996) .
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The evidence is that the betting market yields accurate forecasts. The horse racing results indicate that the market can distinguish among horses of different quality. With a particular exception, the probabilities obtained from the odds rank of the horses are well calibrated with the observed frequency of wins. (Sauer, 1998 (Sauer, , pp. 2035 (Sauer, and 2044 . The exception to the aforementioned calibration occurs at the extremes of the odds distribution. This result found in most studies of horse racing in the US yields what has been called "the favorite-long shot bias."
This means that an insufficient amount is bet upon the horses that are favored to win and an excessive amount is bet on the long shots, thus distorting the odds at the extremes.
B. Baseball
In the baseball market, Woodland and Woodland (1994, p.275; 1999 , p.339) and Gandar et al. (2002 , p.1313 all indicate that the odds are related to the observed outcomes, but the relationship is not strictly monotonic.
11 Woodland and Woodland (1994) argued that betting in baseball yielded a reverse favorite-underdog bias, with underdogs underbet. Gandar et al. (2002) made a minor correction to the Woodland-Woodland methodology and found that if there were any bias, it was very slight.
C. American Football
We must distinguish between picking winners and betting against the spread when the forecasting performance of the American football betting market is evaluated. Boulier and
Stekler (2003) and Song et al. (2007) showed, that in every year from 1994-2001, the football betting market correctly predicted the winner of NFL games at least 63% of the time. The average over this time period was about 65%. In fact, in selecting the winners of games, the betting market was the most accurate forecasting method in every year. Moreover, there was a positive relationship between the point spread and the ex post winning percentage of the home team, but the increase is not monotonic.
In analyzing the market's performance relative to the spread, the main question is: Are there any observed biases? The overwhelming majority of the evidence indicates that the betting market is efficient in the sense that, on average, there is no profitable betting strategy against the spread. The traditional method for determining whether a forecast is unbiased is to run the regression:
where A is the actual value and F is the forecast. If the joint null hypothesis that a = 0 and b =1 is rejected, the forecasts are biased. In the football betting market, the equivalent equation is:
where DP is the difference in the game score (actual points) and PS is the betting-market point spread.
12 If the forecast is unbiased, on average, the difference in the point scores will not differ significantly from the point spreads. Most studies do not reject the null hypothesis that a = 0 and b = 1, but the explanatory power of the equation is usually low, indicating that there is considerable unexplained variation. The studies that have examined the basketball betting market have not found any significant biases. There is a slight but insignificant underestimate of the home-court advantage, (Brown and Sauer 1993a ) and large favorites may be over bet Weinbach, 2005a, 2005b) . Gandar et al. (1998 Gandar et al. ( , 2000 examine the differences between the opening and closing point lines for NBA games 14 and show that frequently there are large changes between the opening and closing quotations. Since they show that the opening line is not as accurate as the closing line in forecasting the margin of victory, they conclude that informed bettors have eliminated some of the bias in the opening line.
F. Soccer
Gambling in soccer is based on odds, but this betting market is different from those that have been analyzed above. The bookmakers set the odds at the beginning of a week and do not change them during the betting period. In one of the few studies that searched for biases, Cain et al. (2000) showed that there was a favorite-longshot bias, similar to that found in horse racing, in the soccer betting market. Many studies have found that models contained information that was not embodied in the odds (Pope and Peel, 1989; Kuypers, 2000; Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004; Dixon and Pope 2004) . These findings suggest that the forecasts embedded in the bookmakers' odds were inefficient.
G. Summary and Discussion of Biases
14 Gandar et al. (1998) examine the winning margin (the difference in the scores of the two teams) while Gandar et al. (2000) analyze the totals betting market (the sum of the scores of the teams). The opening line is set early in the day that the game is played and the closing line is established just before the game begins. It is unlikely that much new information about the teams will have become available during the course of the day. 14 There are mixed results about the existence of biases in the market forecasts. 15 The bias in horse racing occurs at the two extremes: favorites are underbet and long-shots are overbet, but these results do not hold in all countries. Similarly, in soccer Cain et al. (2000) and Deschamps (2007) found biases. On the other hand, in markets where odds are quoted, the ex ante betting probabilities and the ex post relative frequencies are calibrated. The betting spread is an unbiased predictor of the winning margins in American football and basketball. Moreover, the betting market correctly predicted the winner of NFL games about 2/3 of the time.
However, the presence of a forecast bias in this type of financial market, such as the horse race and sports event betting markets, is an anomaly, and explanations have been based on forecasting characteristics or bettor preferences (See Sauer, 1998; Vaughan Williams, 1999 Vergin, 2001; Forrest and McHale, 2007) . There are several explanations for this bias.
One concerns bettors' preferences; another involves issues in forecasting, namely the role of information and individual's ability to interpret the information. We are only concerned with the forecast issues.
When the odds are wide and less information is available, a longshot bias is more likely (Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1998; Forrest and McHale, 2007) . When more information is available publicly and the bettors are better informed, the more likely it is that the consensus forecast (represented by the market odds) will converge to the true odds. Empirical evidence involving horse racing is consistent with this view. The bias is diminished if either the betting pool or the number of horses in the race is increased. (Busche and Hall, 1988; Gramm and Owens, 2005) .
On the other hand, there is the possibility that new information, especially if it is positive, might introduce a bias. Vergin (2001) argued that bettors (forecasters) in the NFL market were subject to an overreaction bias. They overreact to the most recent positive information and undervalue other data: "For example, if a team won a game by a very large margin in a given week, the betting public would tend to overrate the team in the following week" (Vergin, 2001, p. 499) . 16 Vergin found that, in most cases, over 15 seasons, the bettors had displayed a bias in interpreting recent positive data. Gray and Gray (1997) also found that the market overreacted to the most recent information.
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The non-sports forecasting literature has also analyzed the way that individuals interpret information. Kahnemann and Tversky (1982) had argued that individuals place too much emphasis on new information, but some experimental data suggested the opposite: people anchor on past observations and place too little emphasis on new information. The data from the football betting market seem to favor the former view about the role that new information plays in generating a forecast.
The manner in which information is interpreted has also been discussed in the context of the "hot hand" belief in the basketball betting market. This is a belief that a team that wins a game is more likely to win the next game and indicates that forecasters believe that these events are not independent but rather are positively autocorrelated. Camerer (1989) argues that the hot hand is a myth and that bettors have a misunderstanding of random processes, especially with small samples. Brown and Sauer (1993b) conclude that the hot hand belief is embodied in the point spread and is, therefore, an important effect. 18 They were unable, however, to determine whether this was a real phenomenon or whether bettors misperceived the real process and thus displayed a cognitive bias.
An alternative, and perhaps supplementary, explanation involves the forecasting abilities of the individuals who place bets. Golec and Tamarkin (1995) argued that bettors were overconfident in their abilities to predict. This result is consistent with the findings from some laboratory experiments indicating that individuals generally underestimate the probability of likely events and overestimate the probability that an unlikely event will occur. 
III. Results-Models
We again must note that the models have frequently not been used to make ex ante forecasts. Consequently, we only have a limited amount of information about the forecasting records of these models.
A. Horse Racing
A multinomial logit model of horse racing that included characteristics of both the horse and the jockey had an adjusted R 2 of .09 (Bolton and Chapman, 1986) . The equation explains only 9% more than the null that each horse has an equal chance of winning. Expanded versions of this model somewhat improved the explanatory power of the equation, yielding an adjusted R 2 exceeding 12% (Bentner, 1994; Chapman, 1994) . While the final betting odds have even more explanatory power, a combination of the model and the market odds improves upon both.
This finding is consistent with the results obtained from the non-sports forecasting literature which indicates that combining forecasts usually improves accuracy.
B. Baseball
There is so much information about baseball that it is surprising how few forecasts are available for analysis. The Bukiet et al. model (1997) , based on modeling the effects of every play, was used to predict the actual number of games that each team in the National League would win in 1989. The results were mixed: the model failed to predict one of the two divisional winners and the number of runs that were scored was underestimated. Nevertheless, the Spearman Rank Correlation between the predicted and actual number of games that each team won was .77 (Authors' calculations).
Two other models have been used to predict divisional winners. Barry and Hartigan (1993) used a binary-choice model to calculate the probability that in 1991 a National League team would win its division. Using simulations, the model successfully showed that Atlanta's probability of winning its division was increasing as the season progressed. Finally, Smyth and Smyth (1994) based their predictions of division winners and relative standings on the payrolls of each of the teams in each division and league. They found that the rankings within a division were correlated with the teams' payrolls.
C. Football
The models that forecast the outcome of football games are frequently evaluated on their 20 Szymanski (2003 Szymanski ( , p. 1154 presented similar results for soccer. He showed that, within each league, the winning performance of a team was associated with the relative size of the teams' payrolls. Forrest et al. (2005a) use payrolls as a measure of team quality. 18 ability to predict the margin of victory rather than the outright winner. The Zuber et al., (1985) and Sauer et al., (1988) models, based on the fundamental characteristics of the teams, correctly predicted a margin of victory that would have been profitable 59% of the time for games played in 1983, but the success rate was only 39% in 1984. 21 The Dana and Knetter (1994) model, using proxy variables, was accurate less than 50% of the time. On the other hand, the predictions of the Glickman and Stern (1998) model for the last eight weeks of the 1993 season were comparable to the betting line and would have been profitable.
Variants of power scores have been used in forecasting both the outcomes of football games and the margins of victory. Harville (1980) found that in the 1971-77 seasons the betting market, with a 72% success rate in selecting the winner, was more accurate than his statistical procedure, which was right 70% of the time. power score would win. These forecasts had an accuracy ratio of 61%, less than that of the betting market which had an accuracy ratio of approximately 65% and only comparable to a naive forecast that the home team will win.
An intensive evaluation of the forecasting record of statistical systems indicated that they had a 62% average accuracy ratio in picking the winners of the games played in the 2000 and 2001 NFL seasons. (Song et al., 2007) . This ratio was comparable to the record of experts but less than the 66% accuracy of the betting market. Every system had a success rate of at least 50% and the ratios for all but one system were significantly different from those that could have 21 The papers did not indicate the number of times that the model predicted the winners of each game, but the models explained 73-81% of the variance of the score differentials for the two NFL seasons. 22 These success rates are higher than the accuracy that has been observed in more recent seasons. One explanation is that more ties occurred in the earlier seasons and Harville counted a tie as ½ of a successful forecast. Harville did not report the methods' record in betting against the spread. Alternatively, in a tournament, the seedings of the teams, which are obtained from a statistical scoring system, can be used as a predictor. Since 1985, the NCAA has selected 64 college basketball teams to participate in a tournament to select a field to compete for the men's national championship. The 64 teams are divided into four regional tournaments of 16 teams that are ranked from 1 through 16. 24 Boulier and Stekler (1999) , Caudill and Godwin (2002) , Kaplan and Garstka (2001), Caudill (2003) , and Harville (2003) all found that the difference in ranks predicted the winner around 70% of the time.
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The accuracy of forecasts based on ranks has been compared with that of other methods. 23 The test was based on the binomial distribution and a 5% level of significance. 24 The seeds are determined from a statistical scoring system, the RPI, called the ratings percentage index. It gives weights of .25, .50, and .25 to the team's winning percentage, the winning percentage of its opponents, and winning percentage of the opponents' opponents, respectively.
25 Caudill (2003) pointed out that probit models do not maximize the number of correct predictions. He uses a maximum score estimator and achieves a slight increase in predictive accuracy. 20 Kaplan and Garstka (2001) found that forecasts based on picking the higher seeds was slightly more accurate than using the betting market and that forecasts based on the Sagarin system were superior to both. Harville (2003) then compared the forecasting accuracy of his statistical method with (1) forecasting that the higher seed will win and (2) The Poisson distribution is a model used to predict the number of goals that teams will score. Dixon and Coles (1997) show that this distribution provides a good fit to the score data for the 1992-95 seasons. Dixon and Pope (2004) then showed that the probabilities obtained from the Dixon-Coles (1997) model are similar to those of the bookmakers (as derived from the odds). 27 The model of Cain et al. (2000) used the win-lose odds prices quoted by the bookmakers rather than attack-defense proxies as independent variables to predict the total number of goals each team scored. The model generated probability forecasts that approximated the observed distribution of particular scores. Goddard (2005) showed that models based on goals and those derived from scores gave similar results.
Since the abilities and performance of teams can change over time, some models have 26 Harville also found that there was no significant difference between the market and statistical systems in the football bowl games played after the 2001 regular season. 27 Dixon and Coles do not provide a detailed evaluation, nor do they compare their predictions with a naive forecast that the home team wins 46%, draws 27%, and loses 27% of the time.
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become dynamic to capture these effects. Dixon and Coles were among the first to incorporate dynamic factors into a model. Crowder et al. (2002) derived an approximation to the DixonColes model and show that the two models yield similar results. The success ratio, associated with the prediction that the home team will win, is, however, only around 50%. The Bayesian dynamic model of Rue and Salveson (2000) yielded model likelihood measures that were very similar to the bookmakers' odds. Moreover, they used retrospective analysis to predict the posterior final rankings of the teams in the English Premier League. The relationship between the actual and predicted rankings in the 1997-1998 season was not perfect. The model forecast that Manchester United had a 43% chance of being the highest-ranked team; it finished second to an Arsenal team that had been given a 25% chance. Nevertheless, the model correctly selected the top four teams in the League.
The discrete choice models were based on ordered probits that included a variety of explanatory variables. Kuypers (2000) and Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) both indicated that there was little difference between their models' and bookmakers' probabilities.
F. Summary
Models that explain the outcomes of games or matches have been estimated for many sports. Sometimes the models were derived from the fundamental characteristics of the sport. In other instances, variables that were proxies for these fundamental characteristics were used as explanatory variables or discrete-choice models were used. The forecasts of many models were not available. Betting systems, however, correctly predicted the winners of NFL games more than 60% of the time which was comparable to the accuracy of experts but less than that of the market. The soccer models were comparable in accuracy to bookmaker odds.
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IV. Results-Experts
A. Horse Racing Figlewski (1979) examined the forecasting record of a number of horse-racing handicappers. While the handicappers were successful 28.7% of the time in selecting the winning horse, the favorite, as measured by the betting odds, won 29.4% of the time. Both the track-odds and the handicappers improved over the null that all horses had an equal probability of winning, but combining the handicappers' selections with the market odds did not significantly improve forecasting accuracy. 28 In Britain, the odds in the handicapper's morning line were also less accurate in predicting the probability of winning than were the final market odds (Crafts, 1985) .
The experts also displayed the favorite-longshot bias. Snyder (1978) found that the favorite-long shot bias of official race-track handicappers and newspaper forecasters was greater than that of the general public. Lo (1994) showed that the favorite-longshot bias associated with the handicappers' morning-line odds was even larger than that of the final odds of the betting market.
B. Baseball
Despite all the predictions that are made every year by experts about the relative expected performance of the Major League teams, we found only one study that examined the quality of those forecasts. Smyth and Smyth (1994) found that the experts' forecasts were better than random guesses. The predictions of those experts, however, were not significantly different from those based on the rankings of teams' payrolls.
C. Football
We found information about two types of experts: bookmakers and sports commentators (analysts). 29 In both NFL and college football games the bookmakers set an opening line that is biased. In both cases, the opening line contains sentimental beliefs of some bettors. The final line is more accurate indicating that some of the inefficiencies are eliminated (Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Dare et al., 2005) . Song et al. (2007) concluded that experts predicted the game winner approximately 62% of the time; this was the same accuracy ratio as the statistical systems achieved, but was less than the betting market's 66%. Similarly, the accuracy ratios of both the experts and systems in forecasting against the betting line were 50%. On average, the experts did worse than if they had used the naive model of flipping a coin. Avery and Chevalier (1999) reported a similar result.
Less comprehensive studies yield similar findings. Boulier and Stekler (2003) report that 60% of the time the sports-editor of the New York Times selected the winner of the games played during the 1994-2000 seasons. Even earlier, Pankoff (1968) showed that experts' 29 For information about the process of setting the opening line (spread ) on football games, see Schoenfeld, (2003) . 24 accuracy in forecasting whether a team would beat the spread ranged from 48% to 56%.
D. Basketball
While there are no studies that have directly examined the forecasts of experts in predicting the outcomes of basketball games, there is one piece of indirect evidence. The bookmakers who set the opening line or point spread can be considered experts. The evidence is that the opening line that is established by the bookmakers is somewhat less accurate than the closing line established by the betting market (Gandar, et al., 1998) . 30 This indicates that experts are not as accurate as the market in forecasting the winning margins. This result, however, does not imply that the experts exhibit a bias, because the changes between the opening and closing lines seem to be normally distributed around zero, the point of no change (Gandar et al., 1998, Table IV, p. 395 ).
E. Soccer
We have data that evaluates the forecasts of two types of experts. The first is the group of tipsters who write for newspapers; 31 the second consists of the bookmakers who provide the fixed odds. The evidence is that the tipsters' forecasts have little value and that they do not process public information properly (Pope and Peel, 1989; Forrest and Simmons, 2000) .
In contrast, Forrest et al. (2005) demonstrate that there is virtually no difference between the accuracy of the forecasts of the odds makers and those obtained from a complex statistical model. This result is consistent with previous results because Kuypers ( , Table 2, p.1359 had shown that the bookmakers' odds, when converted into probabilities are closely related to 30 While the results are significantly different, the differences are too small to be economically meaningful. 31 Andersson et al. (2005) evaluated the predictions of the outcome of the 2002 World Cup matches made by individuals who had familiarity with soccer. The participants were called experts but in reality they were not "real" experts. In any event, their predictions were no better than those that could have occurred by chance. the relative frequencies of the outcome of the events. (Also see Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004 ).
F. Summary
There are many types of experts and the extent of their knowledge differs among the various groups. Experts who have a financial stake in the forecast are likely to be more knowledgeable. There is no evidence that experts consistently outperform the betting market and in football their accuracy is about the same as that of statistical systems. It should, however, be noted that models that tried to explain the behavior of bookmakers, who can be considered to be experts, showed that these individuals had not omitted important information in setting odds.
(See Graham and Stott, 2008) .
V. Applicability of These Results to Forecasting in General
The results relating to the various sports are so similar that the conclusions have to be considered robust. Some of these results are in accord with the generally accepted views of the forecasting profession; others are in conflict with those beliefs or require further research.
A. The findings that agree with our a priori views:
1. Forecasters correctly used information to reduce the biases that they observed.
In horse racing, more information reduced the favorite-longshot bias; the final odds in horse racing were less biased than those of the racetrack's handicapper; in basketball and NFL games the closing spread was closer to the margin of victory than was the opening quote. 1. Our analysis of these sports forecasts seriously conflicts with the widely held belief that the predictions derived from statistical methods are more accurate than those of experts. The analysis of 31000 NFL forecasts by Song et al. (2007) showed that the accuracy of the two methods of forecasting was virtually identical. The accuracy of the statistical methods was, however, less variable.
2. Similarly in soccer, there was no difference between the accuracy of the models' and bookmakers' forecasts.
C. Further Research Required
An area that requires further research concerns the relative weight that forecasters place on new and old information. There is a gambler's fallacy that the next outcome, even though it is independent of previous events, depends on events that have previously occurred. This fallacy has been observed in horse-racing studies and the hot hand belief in basketball. This is akin to placing too much weight on new information (Vaughan Williams, 1999, pp. 15-16) . The majority of the evidence indicates that forecasters overreact to new information rather than anchor on the old forecast and adjust it in the face of the new data. Sauer (1998 Sauer ( , p. 2059 32 This finding not only agrees with the theory about economic efficiency but also with the evidence that the market price is the best predictor of the event because the market aggregates all the information that is relevant to the event (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004 
